Discrete final-offer arbitration model (Development of the optimization theory for the dynamic systems and their applications) by Mazalov, Vladimir V. & Zabelin, Anatoliy A.
Title
Discrete final-offer arbitration model (Development of the
optimization theory for the dynamic systems and their
applications)
Author(s)Mazalov, Vladimir V.; Zabelin, Anatoliy A.










Institute of Applied Mathematical Research
Karelian Research Center of Russian Academy of Sciences
Pushkinakaya str. 11, Petrozavodsk 185610, Russia
e-mail : vmazalov@krc.karelia.ru
Anatoliy A. Zabelin
Chita State Pedagogical University
Babushkin str. 121, Chita 672090, Russia
Abstract
Abargaining problem with two players Labor (player L) and Management (player M) is considered.
The players must decide the monthly wage payed to $\mathrm{L}$ by M. At the begining players
$\mathrm{L}$ and $\mathrm{M}$
submit their offers $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ . If $s_{1}\leq s_{2}$ there is an agreement at $(s_{1}+s_{2})/2$ . If not, the arbitrator
is called in and he chooses the offer which is nearest for his solution $\alpha$ . We suppose that asolution
$\alpha$ is concentrated in two points $a$ , $1-a$ at the interval $[0, 1]$ with probabilities $p$ , $q=1-p$. The
equilibrium in the arbitration game among pure and mixed strategies is derived.
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1Introduction
We consider azer0-sum game related with amodel of the labor-management negotiations
using an arbitration procedure. Imagine that two players: Labor (player $L$ ) and Management
(player $M$) bargain on awage bill which has to be in the range $[0, 1]$ where the current wage
bill is normalised at zero, and the known maximum management ability to pay is at 1.
Player $L$ is interested to maximize awage bill as much as possible and the player $M$ has the
opposite goal.
At the begining the players $L$ and $M$ submit their offers $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ respectively, $s_{1}$ , $s_{2}\in$
$[0,1]$ . If $s_{1}\leq s_{2}$ there is an agreement at $(s_{1}+s_{2})/2$ . If not, the arbitrator $A$ is called in
and he has to choose one of the decisions.
There are different approaches in analyzing the arbitration models [1-6]. We consider
here the final-0ffer arbitration procedure [3] which allows the arbitrator only to choose one
of the two final offers made by the players. We suppose here that the arbitrator imposes a
solution $\alpha$ which is random variable being concentrated in two points $a$ and $b=1-a$ with
different probabilities $p$ and $q=1-p$, $0\leq a,p\leq 1$ . The arbitrator chooses the offer which
is nearest for his solution $\alpha$ . The solution of this game with equal $p=q=1/2$ was obtained
in [6]. In this paper we obtain the solution of this game where $p$ and $q$ can be non-equal
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So, we have azer0-sum game determined in the unit square where the strategies of
players L and M are the real numbers $s_{1}$ , $s_{2}\in[0,$ 1] and payoff function in this game has
form $H(s_{1}, s_{2})=EH_{\alpha}(s_{1},s_{2})$ , where
$H_{\alpha}(s_{1},s_{2})=\{$
$(s_{1}+\mathit{8}_{2})/2$ , if $s_{1}\leq s_{2}$
$s_{1}$ , if $s_{1}>s_{2}$ , $|s_{1}-\alpha|<|s_{2}-\alpha|$
$s_{2}$ , if $s_{1}>s_{2}$ , $|s_{1}-\alpha|>|s_{2}-\alpha|$
$\alpha$ , if $s_{1}>s_{2}$ , $|s_{1}-\alpha|=|s_{2}-\alpha|$
(1)
Below we show that the equilibrium in this game in dependence on value a can be among
pure (section 2) and mixed (sections 3-4) strategies.
2Solution of the game. Pure strategies
Theorem 1. Let $p\in(0,0.5]$ and $a\in[0,p/2]$ . Equilibrium consists of pure strategies and
has form $s_{1}^{*}=1$ , $s_{2}^{*}=0$ . The value of the game $v=q$.
Proof. Let player II uses $s_{2}=0$ . The payoff of player Iis equal to:
for $s_{1}\in[0,2a)H(s_{1},0)=ps_{1}+qs_{1}=s_{1}<2a\leq p\leq q$,
for $s_{1}=2aH(2a,0)=pa+(1-p)2a=(2-p)a<2a\leq p\leq q$ ,
for $s_{1}\in(2a, 1]\#(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i},0)=fl$ $+qs_{1}=qs_{1}$ .
The maximum of the function is reached for $s_{1}=1$ and equals to $q$ . Now, suppose that
player Iuses $s_{1}=1$ . For $s_{2}\in[0,1-2a)H(1,s2)=ps_{2}+q$. Minimum of this function lies in
$s_{2}=0$ and equal to $q$ . For $s_{2}=1-2aH(1,1-2a)=p(1-2a)+q(1-a)=1-a-ap$ . Because
$p/(1+p)>p/2\geq a$ , it follows $p>a+ap$ and $1-a-ap>1-p=q$ . For $s_{2}\in(1-2a, 1]$
$H(s_{1},s_{2})=ps_{2}+qs_{2}=s_{2}$ . According to condition $p\geq 2a$ we have $s_{2}\geq 1-2a>1-p=q$ .
So, for all $s_{2}H(1, s_{2})\geq q$ and $\#(\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i},0)\leq q$ for aU $s_{1}$ . Hence, $\{s_{1}=1,s_{2}=0\}$ ia an
equiliblium in the game and $v$ $=q$.
Analogous arguments leads to
Theorem 2. Let $p\in(0.5,1)$ and $a\in[0,q/2]$ . Equilibrium consists of pure strategies and
has form $s_{1}^{*}=1$ , $s_{2}^{*}=0$ , and value of the game $v=q$.
3Method for obtaining the equilibrium among mixed
startegies
In case $a> \min\{p/2,q/2\}$ equilibrium consists of mixed strategies, i.e. randomised strategies
of players $\mathrm{L}$ and M. Denote $F_{1}$ (si) and $F_{2}(s_{2})$ distribution functions of the strategies for $\mathrm{L}$
and $\mathrm{M}$ , respectively. Suppose, that Fi(si) $[F_{2}(s_{2})]$ is continuous and its support consists
of two intervals ( $\alpha_{1};\alpha_{2}]$ and ( $\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}][(\beta_{1};$ &], (a3; $\mathrm{a}4$ ]$]$ at the [0; 1] with $\alpha_{2}\leq\alpha_{3}[\beta_{2}\leq\beta_{3}]$ .
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(3)
In extreme points of the interval [0; 1] functions $F_{1}(s_{1})$ and $F_{2}(s_{2})$ can have agap. Let also
$\beta_{4}\leq\alpha_{1}$ , $F_{1}(\alpha_{1})=0$ and $F_{2}(\beta_{4})=1$ .
Let $F_{1,12}(s_{1})$ and $F_{1,34}(s_{1})$ denote the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}$ rm of $F_{1}(s_{1})$ at the intervals ( $\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$ ] and ( $\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}]$ ;
and, respectively, $F_{2,12}(s_{2})$ and $F_{2,34}(s_{2})$ -for the function $F_{2}(s_{2})$ at ( $\beta_{1};\beta_{2}]$ and $(\beta_{3};\beta_{4}]$ .
Firtsly, consider the case $p\leq 0.5$ . Admit, that the intervals ( $\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$ ] and ($\beta_{1}$ ; $\beta_{2}$ ] are
symmetric in respect on the point $a$ and the intervals ( $\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}]$ and ( $\beta_{3};\beta_{4}]$ are symmetric in
respect on 6. Otherwords,
$\alpha_{1}=2a-\beta_{2}$ , $\beta_{1}=2a-\alpha_{2}$ , $\alpha_{4}=2b-\beta_{3}$ , $\beta_{4}=2b-\alpha_{3}$ . (2)
Suppose, that player $\mathrm{L}(\mathrm{M})$ uses amixed strategy $F_{1}(s_{1})(F_{2}(s_{2}))$ and consider the
payoffs of the players.
For $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$ ],
$H(s_{1}, F_{2}(s_{2}))=p \{s_{1}F_{2,12}(2a-s_{1})+\int_{2a-s_{1}}^{\beta_{2}}s_{2}dF_{2,12}(s_{2})+\int_{\beta_{3}}^{2b-\alpha \mathrm{s}}s_{2}dF_{2,34}(s_{2})\}+qs_{1}$ .
For $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}]$ ,
$H(s_{1}$ , F2(s2 ) $=p\{$ 0 $\cdot F_{2}(0)+\int_{2a-\alpha_{2}}^{\beta_{2}}s_{2}dF_{2,12}(s_{2})+\int_{\beta_{3}}^{2b-\alpha_{3}}s_{2}dF_{2,34}(s_{2})\}$
(5)






$+ \int_{\alpha_{3}}^{2b-s_{2}}s_{1}dF_{1,34}(s_{1})+s_{2}(1-F_{1,34}(2b-s_{2}))\}$ . (6)
If $F_{1}^{*}(s_{1})$ , $F_{2}^{*}(s_{2})$ are optimal then the equations $H(s_{1}, F_{2}^{*}(s_{2}))=v$ and $H(F_{1}^{*}(s_{1}), s_{2})=$
$v$ , must be satisfied in the support-intervals where $v$-value of the game. Hence,
$H(s_{1}, F_{2}^{*}(s_{2}))=v$ , $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{1};\alpha_{2}]\cup(\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}]$ ,
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$H(F_{1}^{*}(s_{1}), s_{2})=v$ , $s_{2}\in(\beta_{1}$ ; $\beta_{2}$] $\cup(\beta_{3;}\beta_{4}]$ .
From here,
$\frac{\partial H(s_{1},F_{2}^{*}(s_{2}))}{\partial s_{1}}=0$, $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$ ] $\cup(\alpha_{3;}\alpha_{4}]$ ,
$\frac{\partial H(F_{1}^{*}(s_{1}),s_{2})}{\partial s_{2}}=0$, $s_{2}\in(\beta_{1;}\beta_{2}]\cup(\beta_{3;}\beta_{4}]$ .
Finding the derivative of (3-4) in $s_{1}$ and putting it equal to 0, and using the admission that
$F_{2}^{*}(\beta_{4})=1$ and $F_{2}^{*}(s_{2})$ is continuous at $[\beta_{2};\beta_{3}]$ , consequently, $F_{2}^{*}(\beta_{2})=F_{2}^{*}(\beta_{3})$ , we obtain
the system of differential equations with boundary conditions:
$p\{2(s_{1}-a)F_{2,12}^{*’}(2a-s_{1})-F_{2,12}^{*}(2a-s_{1})\}-q=0$ , $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{1};\alpha_{2}]$ ,
$q\{2(b-s_{1})F_{2,34}^{*’}(2b-s_{1})+F_{2,34}^{*}(2b-s_{1})\}=0$, $s_{1}\in(\alpha_{3;}\alpha_{4}]$ ,
$F_{2,34}^{*}(\beta_{4})=1$ , $F_{2,12}^{*}(\ )$ $=F_{2\beta 4}^{*}(\ )$ .
Changing the arguments $t_{1}=2a-s_{1}$ , $t_{1}\in(\beta_{1};\beta_{2}$] in the first equation and $t_{2}=2b-s_{1}$ ,
$t_{2}\in(\beta_{3};\beta_{4}$] in the second one we obtain the system:
$\frac{dt_{1}}{2(a-t_{1})}=\frac{dF_{2,12}^{*}}{F_{2,12}^{*}+p/q}$, $\frac{dt_{2}}{2(b-t_{2})}=\frac{dF_{2,34}^{*}}{F_{2,34}^{*}}$ .
The solution which satisfies the boundary conditions has the following form
$F_{2}^{*}(s_{2})=\{\begin{array}{l}\mathrm{I})pa\not\in a---s_{2}p\mathrm{I},\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}2a-\alpha_{2}<s_{2}\leq\beta_{2}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}s_{2}\leq 2a-\alpha_{2}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\oe<\mathit{8}_{2}\leq\ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}h<\mathit{8}_{2}\leq 2b-\alpha_{3}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}2b-\alpha_{3}<s_{2}\end{array}$ (7)
Finding the derivative of (5-6) in $s_{2}$ and putting it equal to 0, and using the admission
$F_{1}^{*}(\alpha_{1})=0$ and $F_{1}^{*}(\alpha_{2})=F_{1}^{*}(\alpha_{3})$ , we obtain the system:
$p\{1-F_{1,12}^{*}(2a-s_{2})-2(a-s_{2})F_{1,12}^{*’}(2a-s_{2})\}=0$ , $s_{2}\in(\beta_{1;}\beta_{2}]$ ,
$p+q\{1-F_{1,34}^{*}(2b-s_{2})-2(b-s_{2})F_{1,34}^{*’}(2b-s_{2})=0\}$ , $s_{2}\in(\beta_{3;}\beta_{4}]$ ,
$F_{1,12}^{*}(\alpha_{1})=0$ , $F_{1,12}^{*}(\alpha_{2})=F_{1,34}^{*}(\alpha_{3})$ .
Let change the arguments $t_{1}=2a-s_{2}$ , $t_{1}\in(\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$] in the first equation, and $t_{2}=2b-s_{2}$ ,
$t_{2}\in(\alpha_{3};\alpha_{4}$ ] in the second equation:
$\frac{dt_{1}}{2(t_{1}-a)}=\frac{dF_{1,12}^{*}}{1-F_{1,12}^{*}}$ , $\frac{dt_{2}}{2(t_{2}-b)}=\frac{dF_{1,34}^{*}}{1+p/q+F_{2\beta 4}^{*}}$.
The solution of the system:
$F_{1}^{*}(s_{1})=\{$
0, if $s_{1}\leq 2a-\beta_{2}$ ,
$1-a\not\in 1-a\mathrm{F}_{-a}S\alpha_{2}-a--,$
,
if $2a-\sqrt 2<s_{1}\leq\alpha_{2}$ ,
if $\alpha_{2}<s_{1}\leq 0_{3}$ ,
$1+\mathrm{g}-q(_{\alpha-aq}^{a-\mathrm{z}}\mathrm{F}_{2}+)\alpha \mathrm{F}s_{1-}-$ , if $\alpha_{3}<s_{1}\leq 2b-\beta_{3}$ ,
1, if $2b-\ <s_{1}$ .
(8)
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Now let us substitute the functions (7)$-(8)$ to (3) $-(6)$ . For $\mathit{8}1\in(\alpha_{1}$ ; $\alpha_{2}$ ],











0, if $F_{1}^{*}(1)=1$ ,



















If $F_{1}^{*}(1)=1$ (or, $F_{1,34}^{*}(2b-\beta_{3})=1$ , or $\theta=0$), then $y(q/x+p)=p$. Substituting it
to (11) we receive $\beta_{2}=\beta_{3}$ . If $F_{1}^{*}(1)<1$ (2b-&=l), then $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ , $y=\not\in_{a}\alpha-$ and
$q\theta=-p+(q/x+p)y$ .
Analogously, if $F_{2}^{*}(0+)=.0(F_{2,12}^{*}(2a-\alpha_{2})=0)$ , then $1/\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{p}\mathrm{y}+q)=q$ . Substituting to
(11), we receive $\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}$ . If $F_{2}^{*}(0+)>0(2a-\alpha_{2}=0)$ , then $\alpha_{2}=2a$ and $1/x=\mathrm{F}_{a}^{a-}$ .
Thus, take place $F_{1}^{*}(1)=1\Rightarrow\beta_{2}=\$ and $F_{2}^{*}(0+)=0\Rightarrow\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}$ .
Varying different collections of the values $F_{1}^{*}(1)$ and $F_{2}^{*}(0+)$ and demanding that the
support of optimal strategies belongs to [0; 1], we will obtain the form of optimal strategies
depending on values of $a$ and $p$ (see Fig. 1).
4Solution of the game. Mixed Strategies
4.1 Equilibrium for (p,$a)\in D_{1}$
Suppose that $F_{1}^{*}(1)=1$ and $F_{2}^{*}(0+)=0$ (i.e. $\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A$ , $\beta_{2}=\ =\mathrm{B}$). From the equations
$\frac{1}{x}=\mathrm{F}aA-a-$ , $y= \frac{\sqrt{A-}}{\sqrt{b-B}}$ it follows
$\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A=\frac{bx^{2}(1+y^{2})-ay^{2}(1+x^{2})}{x^{2}-y^{2}}$, $\beta_{2}=\beta_{3}=B=\frac{a(1+x^{2})-b(1+y^{2})}{x^{2}-y^{2}}$ . (12)




which positive solution is
x $=$ (13)
$y= \frac{p^{2}-pq-q^{2}+\sqrt{p^{4}+2p^{3}q-p^{2}q^{2}+2pq^{3}+q^{4}}}{2p^{2}}$ . (14)
It is not difficult to check that it satisfies to the third equation in (11).
The values $x,y$ and (12) give the solution of the game iff the following system of inequal-
ities be satisfied





Theorem 3. For $(p,a)\in D_{1}$ the equilibrium is $(F_{1}^{*}, F_{2}^{*})$ of the form (7-8) with parameters
detemined by (12-14). The value of the game:
$v=q(2a-\beta_{2})+p\alpha_{3}-2p(2b-1)\mathrm{f}^{\alpha}\mathrm{f}^{-}-\mathrm{i}_{2}$ .
Notice some properties of the solution:
$\lim_{parrow 0}a_{1}(p)=0.4$ , $\lim_{parrow 0.5}a_{1}(p)=z^{2}$ ,
where $z$ is the “golden section” of the interval $[0, 1]$ . It follows from
$\lim_{parrow 0+}x=1$ , $\lim_{parrow 0+}y=0$ , $\lim_{parrow 0.5-}x=\frac{\sqrt{5}+1}{2}$ ,
$\lim_{parrow 0.5-}y=z=\frac{\sqrt{5}-1}{2}$ .
Notice also, that for fixed $p$ if $a$ decreases then 04 increases to 1and reaches it for $a=a_{1}(p)$
(to obtain it we can substitute $a_{1}(p)$ instead of $a$ to $\alpha_{4}=2-2a-\beta_{3}$ ) . For values $a\leq a_{1}(p)$ ,
the solution of the game is different.
4.2 Equilibrium for (p, a) $\in D_{2}$
If $\mathrm{F};(1)<1$ and $F_{2}^{*}(0+)=0$ (or, equiavently, $\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A$ , $\beta_{2}=B$ , $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ ), then
from the equations $\frac{1}{x}=\not\in_{-a}^{a-}$ and $y=\Leftrightarrow_{a}^{-b}$ we obtain
$\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A=ay^{2}+b$ , $\beta_{2}=B=\frac{a(1+x^{2})-(ay^{2}+b)}{x^{2}}$ . (15)
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Substituting it to the third equation in (11) we obtain
$y(2y^{3}ap^{3}+(-p^{3}+4ap^{2}q+paq^{2}+ap^{3})y^{2}+$
$+(2aq^{3}-2p^{2}q+2paq^{2}+2ap^{2}q)y+3paq^{2}-2pq^{2})/(py+q)^{2}=0$ .
It is sufficient to find only positive roots of (17).
Denoting A $=p/q$ we have
$2a\lambda^{3}y^{3}+\lambda(a+4a\lambda-\lambda^{2}+a\lambda^{2})y^{2}+2(a+a\lambda-\lambda^{2}+a\lambda^{2},)y+\lambda(3a-2)=0$ . (18)
Denote the cubic polynomial at the left side of (18) as $\nu(y)$ , $\nu(0)=\lambda(3a-2)<0$,
$a\in[0;0.5$). The coefficient in higher degree of $y$ in (18) is positive, hence, at least one
postive root exists. From here also follows that the maximum lies before minimum. The
function $\nu$ $=\mathrm{v}(\mathrm{y})$ ha two extreme points $y_{1}= \frac{1}{3}(\frac{1}{a}-\frac{1+\lambda+\lambda^{2}}{\lambda^{2}})$ and $y_{2}=- \frac{1}{\lambda}<0$ . With
$\nu(0)<0$ it gives the uniqueness of the positive root of (18).
The solution takes place in case of $\beta_{1}\geq 0$ , or $a(3-y^{2})\geq 1$ . It determines the lower
border $a_{2}(p)$ of the region $D_{2}$ on the plane $(p,a)$ .
Theorem 4. For $(p,a)\in D_{2}$ the equilibrium is $(F_{1}^{*}, F_{2}^{*})$ of the form (7-8) with parameters
determined by (15-17). The value of the game: $v=q(2a-\beta_{2})+p\alpha_{3}-p(2b-1+\beta_{2})^{\alpha}\not\in_{a}^{-}$ .
In case $a<a_{2}(p)$ the following solution $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ take place.
4.3 Equilibrium for (p,$a)\in D_{3}$
If $F_{1}^{*}(1)<1$ and $F_{2}^{*}(0+)>0$ (or, equivalently, $\alpha_{2}=2a$ , $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ , $\alpha_{3}=A$ , $\beta_{2}=B$),
the first two equations in (11) with $1/x=\Leftrightarrow_{a}^{a-B}$ and $y=\Leftrightarrow_{a}^{A-b}$ (or, $\beta_{2}=B=a-a/x^{2}$ and
$\alpha_{3}=A=ay^{2}+b)$ take the form
$\{$
$2a(py+q)=q(ay^{2}+b)x$ ,
$2ay( \frac{q}{x}+p)=p(b+\frac{a}{x^{2}})$ . (19)
From the first equation in (19) it follows $x= \frac{2a(py+q)}{q(ay^{2}+b)}$ . Substituting it to the second








It is sufficient to find only positive solutions of (20).
Denoting $\lambda=p/q$ we rewrite (20) in the form
$3a^{2}\lambda y^{4}+4a^{2}(1+2\lambda^{3})y^{3}+2a\lambda(1-a+8a\lambda-2\lambda^{2}+2a\lambda^{2})y^{2}+$
$+4\mathrm{a}(1-a+2a\lambda-2\lambda^{2}+2a\lambda^{2})y-(1-a)(1+3a)\lambda=0$ .
Denote $\nu(y)$ polynomials at the left side of the equation. Then $\nu(0)=-(1-a)(1+3a)\lambda<$
$0$ , and because the coefficient in higher degree of $y$ is positive then there exists at least one
positive root of the equation. Let us show that it is unique. It follows from the fact that the
points where $\nu’(y)=0$ are negative.
$\nu’(y)=36a^{2}\lambda y^{2}+24a^{2}(1+2\lambda^{3})y+4a\lambda((1-a)(1-2\lambda^{2})+8a\lambda)$ .
If this parabola has no roots then $\nu(y)$ is concave and the positive root is unique. Let
there are two roots
$y_{1,2}=$
The root $y_{1}$ is negative. Coefficient in higher degree of $y$ of $\nu’(y)$ is positive, hence, the
largest root $y_{2}$ is negative, iff the coefficient in lower degree of $\nu(y)$ is positive. It is equal
to $\xi(a,\lambda)=(1-a)(1-2\lambda^{2})+8\mathrm{a}\mathrm{A}$. We have: $\xi(a,\mathrm{O})=1-a>0$ , the function $\xi(a, \lambda)$ is
convex in $\lambda$ , $\xi(a, 1)=9a-1$ . If $a> \frac{1}{9}$ , then $\xi(a, \lambda)>0$ , coefficient in lower degree in $\nu’(y)$
is positive, $y_{2}$ is negative, hence, the positive root of the equation is inique.
The solution takes place, iff $\beta_{2}\geq 0$ or $\frac{ay^{2}+b}{2a(1+\lambda y)}\leq 1$ . this enequality determines the lower
border $a_{3}(p)$ of the region $D_{3}$ on the plane $(p, a)$ . Notice, that in $D_{3}$ the inequality $a< \frac{1}{9}$ is
satisfied automatically.
Theorem 5. For $(p, a)\in D_{3}$ the equilibrium is $(F_{1}^{*}, F_{2}^{*})$ of the form (7-8) with parameters
detemined by (19-20). The value of the game: $v=q(2a- \beta_{2})+p\alpha_{3}-p(2b-1+\beta_{2})\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-}}{\sqrt{a}}$.
For fixed $p$ , if $a$ decreases from $a_{2}(p)$ to $a_{3}(p)$ , then $\beta$ decreases to zero. Finally, consider
the case $a<a_{3}(p)$ .
4.4 Equilibrium for (p,$a)\in D_{4}$
For $\alpha_{1}=\alpha_{2}=2a$ , $\alpha_{4}=1$ , $\beta_{1}=\beta_{2}=0$ , $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ the optimal strategies are
$F_{1}^{*}(s_{1})=\{$
0, if $s_{1}\leq\alpha_{3}$ ,
$\frac{1}{q}(1-\alpha Fs_{1}-b-b)$ , if $\alpha_{3}<s_{1}\leq 1$ ,









1, if $2b-a_{3}<s_{2}$ .
Then, for $s_{1}\in(\mathrm{a}_{3};1]$
(22)
$H_{2}=H(s_{1}, F_{2}^{*}(s_{2}))=p \{0\cdot F_{2}^{*}(0)+\int_{2b-1}^{2b-\alpha_{3}}s_{2}dF_{2}^{*}(s_{2})\}+$
$+q \{s_{1}F_{2}^{*}(2b-s_{1})+\int_{2b-s_{1}}^{2b-\alpha_{3}}s_{2}dF_{2}^{*}(s_{2})\}=\alpha_{3}-\frac{p\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{a}}$.
If $s_{2}=0$ , then
$H_{3}=H(F_{1}^{*}(s_{1}),s_{2})=q \{\int_{\alpha \mathrm{s}}^{1}s_{1}dF_{1}^{*}(s_{1})+1\cdot(1-F_{1}^{*}(1))\}=2\sqrt{a}\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}+2b-\alpha_{3}-p$.
If $s_{2}\in(2b-1;2b=\alpha$], then
$H_{4}=H(F_{1}^{*}(s_{1}),s_{2}) \cdot=ps_{2}+q\{\int_{\alpha \mathrm{s}}^{2b-s_{2}}s_{1}dF_{1}^{*}(s_{1})+s_{2}(1-F_{1}^{*}(2b-s_{2}))\}=2b-\alpha_{3}$ .




Solution of this system: $\alpha_{3}=b+\not\simeq 4a$ .
This form for $H_{2}.-H_{4}$, takes place, iff $\alpha_{3}$ $\leq 1$ or, equivalently, $a>p/2$ . That determines
the region $D_{4}$ on the plane $(p, a)$ .
Theorem 6. For $(p,a)\in D_{4}$ the equilibrium is $(F_{1}^{*}, F_{2}^{*})$ of the form (21-22). The value of
the game: $v=b-4L^{2}a$ .
The case $a<p/2$ was analysed in section 2.
5 Solution for p $>0.5$
At the begining we assumed p $\leq 0.5$ . In case p $>0.5$ the solution follows from the following
theorem.
Theorem 7. Let for some fixed values of $a$ and $p$ we found the optimal strategies $F_{1}^{*}(s_{1},p,a)$
and F2(s2, $\mathrm{p},$ $a$ ) in the game with
$P\{\alpha=a\}=p$ , $P\{\alpha=b\}=q$, $a+b=1$ , $p+q=1$ , $a<b$, $p\leq q$ .
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Then the optimal strategies in the game for the same values $a$ , $p$ and for
$P\{\alpha=a\}=q$ , $P\{\alpha=b\}=p$ , $a+b=1$ , $p+q=1$ , $a<b$ , $p\leq q$ ,
are
$G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q,a)=1-F_{2}^{*}(1-s_{1},p, a)$ , $G_{2}^{*}(s_{2},q,a)=1-F_{1}^{*}(1-s_{2},p, a)$ .
Proof. We have
$G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a)=\{$
0, if $s_{1}\leq 1-2b+\alpha_{3}$ ,
$1-f_{-}^{\alpha-}1-\alpha \mathrm{F}sf\overline{-}i_{3}a’$
,
if $1-2b+\alpha_{3}<s_{1}\leq 1-\sqrt 3$ ,
if $1-\sqrt 3<s_{1}\leq 1-\beta_{2}$ ,
$1+lp-( \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-}}{\sqrt{-\mathrm{s}}}+\mathrm{I})ps_{1}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{-}a-$ , if $1-\beta_{2}<s_{1}\leq 1-2a+\alpha_{2}$ ,
1, if $1-2a+\alpha_{2}<\mathit{8}_{1}$ ,
$G_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q, a)=\{$
0, if $s_{2}\leq 1-2b+\beta_{3}$ ,
$\mathrm{F}_{2}^{\alpha_{2}aq}\alpha\not\in_{-s_{2}}(_{a-}^{a-2\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{F}_{2},’+)\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-}}{\sqrt{a-s_{2}}}-q\mathrm{E}a--a$
’ if $1-2b$ % $\sqrt 3<s_{2}\leq 1-\alpha_{3}$ ,
if $1-\alpha_{3}<s_{2}\leq 1-\alpha_{2}$ ,
if $1-\alpha_{2}<s_{2}\leq 1-2a+\beta_{2}$ ,
1, if $1-2a+\beta_{2}<s_{2}$ .
These functions will represent the optimal strategies, iff
$\mathrm{H}\{\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}G_{2}^{*}(s_{2},q,a))=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ for $s_{1}\in(1-2b+\alpha_{3};1-\ ]\cup(1-\beta_{2};1-2a+\alpha_{2}]$,
$H(G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a),s_{2})=\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ for $s_{2}\in(1-2b+\beta_{3};1$ -Q3] $\cup(1$ -a2; $1-2a+\beta_{2}$ ].
Denote $G_{1,12}^{*}(s_{1})$ and $G_{1,34}^{*}(s_{1})$ as the form of function $G_{1}^{*}(s_{1},q, a)$ at the intervals (1-
$2b+\alpha_{3};1-\beta_{3}]$ and ( $1-\beta_{2};1-2a+\alpha_{2}]$ and $G_{2,12}^{*}(s_{1})$ , $G_{2,34}^{*}(s_{1})$ for the $G_{2}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a)$ at the
intervals ( $1-2b+\beta_{3};1$ -a3], ( $1-\alpha_{2};1-2a+\beta_{2}]$ , respectively.
We obtain for $s_{1}\in(1-2b+\alpha_{3};1-\beta_{3}]$
$H_{1}’=H(s_{1}, G_{2}^{*}(s_{1}, q,a))=q \{s_{1}G_{2,12}^{*}(2a-s_{1})+\int_{2a-s_{1}}^{1-\alpha_{3}}s_{2}dG_{2,12}^{*}(s_{2})+\int_{1-\alpha_{2}}^{1-2a+\beta_{2}}s_{2}dG_{2,34}^{*}(s_{2})\}+$
$+ps_{1}=q \frac{\sqrt{a-\beta_{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha_{2}-a}}((\alpha_{3}-2b)-(\alpha_{2}-2a))+p(\alpha_{3}+2a-1)+q(1-\beta_{2})$ .
If $s_{1}\in(1-\beta_{2};1-2a+\alpha_{2}$ ], then




$-q(1- \beta_{3})\frac{\sqrt{a-\beta_{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha_{2}-a}}\cdot\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\beta_{3}}}+p(1-\beta_{2})-p(1-\beta_{3})\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\ }}$ .
If $s_{2}\in(1-2b+\beta_{3};1-\alpha_{3}$ ], then
$H_{3}’=H(G_{1}^{*}(_{\mathit{8}_{1}},q, a), s_{2})=q( \int_{-2b+\alpha_{3}}^{2a-s_{2}}s_{1}dG_{1,12}^{*}(s_{1})+s_{2}(1-G_{1,12}^{*}(2a-s_{2}))\}+$
$+p \{\int_{1-2b+\alpha_{3}}^{1-\beta_{3}}\mathit{8}_{1}dG_{1,12}^{*}(s_{1})+\int_{1-h}^{1-2a+\alpha_{2}}s_{1}dG_{1,34}^{*}(s_{1})+1\cdot(1-G_{1}^{*}(1))\}=$
$=p \frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\ }}((2b-\beta_{3})-(2a-\beta_{2}))+p(1-\alpha_{3})-q(1-2b-\ )-$






0, if $G_{1}^{*}(1)=1$ ,
$-1p+(\mathrm{f}_{-3p}^{\alpha-\iota}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}+)a\mathrm{F}_{a}-$ , if $G_{1}^{*}(1)<1$ .
We have
$\psi_{1}=H_{2}’-H_{1}’=-q(1-\beta_{3})\frac{\sqrt{a-\beta_{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha_{2}-a}}\cdot\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\ }}+p(1- \sqrt 2)-p(1-\beta_{3})\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\sqrt 3}}$,
$\psi_{2}=H_{3}’-H_{4}’=-p(1-\alpha_{2})\frac{\sqrt{\alpha_{3}-b}}{\sqrt{b-\beta_{3}}}\frac{\sqrt{a-\beta_{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha_{2}-a}}+q(1-\alpha_{3})-q(1-\alpha_{2})\frac{\sqrt{a-\beta_{2}}}{\sqrt{\alpha_{2}-a}}+p\eta$ .
There are only four possible forms for the functions $F_{1}^{*}(s_{1},p, a)$ and $F_{2}^{*}(s_{2},p, a)$ . With
$/\chi_{1}=\chi_{2}=0$ , it gives:
1. For $\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A$ , $\beta_{2}$ $=\beta_{3}=B$ take place $\simeq\underline{1}A=\frac{\psi_{2}}{1-A}$ and $\frac{X2}{B}=\frac{\psi_{2}}{1-B}$ , consequently,
$\psi_{1}=\psi_{2}=0$ .
2. For $\alpha_{2}=\alpha_{3}=A$ , $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ take place $\mathrm{g}\underline{\iota}A=\frac{\psi_{2}}{1-A}$ and $\chi_{2}=-\psi_{1}$ , consequently,
$\psi_{1}=\psi_{2}=0$ .
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For $\alpha_{2}=2a$ , $\beta_{3}=1-2a$ take place $\chi_{1}=-\psi_{2}$ and $\chi_{2}=-\psi_{1}$ , consequently, $\psi_{1}=\psi_{2}=$
0.
For $\alpha_{1}=\alpha_{2}=2a$ , $\alpha_{4}=1$ , $\beta_{1}=\beta_{2}=0$ , $\beta_{3}=2b-1$ , the form of $G_{1}^{*}(s_{1})$ , $G_{2}^{*}(s_{2})$ is:
$G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a)=\{$
0, if $s_{1} \leq a+\frac{p^{2}}{4a}$ ,
1– if $a+ \mathrm{E}\frac{2}{a}4<s_{1}\leq 2\mathrm{a}$ ,
$1- \frac{p}{2a}$ , if $2a<s_{1}\leq 1$ ,
1, if $1<s_{1}$ ,
$G_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q,a)=\{$
0, if $s_{2}\leq 0$ ,
$1- \frac{1}{q}(1-$ , if $0<s_{2} \leq a-\frac{p^{2}}{4a}$ ,
1, if $a- \frac{p^{2}}{4a}<s_{2}$ .
Then for $s_{2} \in(0;a-\frac{p^{2}}{4a}]$
$H(G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a), s_{2})=q \{\int_{a+_{4a}^{\mathrm{L}_{-}^{2}}}^{2a-s_{2}}s_{1}dG_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a)+s_{2}(1-G_{1}^{*}(2a-s_{2}, q, a))\}+$
$+p \{\int_{a+_{4}^{e}\frac{2}{a}}^{2a}s_{1}dG_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q, a)+1\cdot(1-G_{1}^{*}(1, q, a))\}=a+\frac{p^{2}}{4a}$.
For $s_{1}\in(a+E^{2};4\overline{a}2a]$
$H(s_{1}, G_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q, a))=q \{s_{1}G_{2}^{*}(2a-s_{1}, q, a)+\int_{2a-s_{1}}^{4}s_{2}dG_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q, a)\}a-R_{\frac{2}{a}}+ps_{1}=a+\frac{p^{2}}{4a}$ .
Finally, for $s_{1}=1$
$H(s_{1}, G_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q, a))=q \int_{0}^{a-_{4}^{\mathrm{p}_{\frac{2}{a}}}}s_{2}dG_{2}^{*}(s_{2}, q, a)+p=a+\frac{p^{2}}{4a}$ .
In all cases the payoff is constant, and with $H_{1}+H_{4}’=1$ , $H_{4}+H_{1}’=1$ and $H_{1}=H_{4}$ ,
;ives $H_{1}’=H_{4}’$ , and all $H_{j}’$ , $i=1$ , .., 4 are equal. It proves the optimality $G_{1}^{*}(s_{1}, q,a)$ and
$(s_{2}, q,a)$ .
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